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ABSTRACT 
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC) was deployed as a multidimensional peacekeeping force in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 1999 until 2010. During this time, violence continued 
to plague the eastern part of the country.  In response to continued civilian casualties, 
MONUC made civilian protection a core component of its mission.  While MONUC 
never succeeded in adequately protecting civilians, a close examination of its mandate 
and operations reveals a continual process of adjustment, ultimately leading to an attempt 
by MONUC to assist in defense sector reform.  The evidence reveals that MONUC’s 
adjustments had a slight effect on reducing ethnic violence from 2003–2007, but violence 
against civilians by the FARDC and rebels did not decrease from 2007–2010.  This thesis 
attempts to explain why MONUC did not succeed in the end at increasing civilian 
protection.  MONUC’s actions to reform the FARDC were not efficacious because 
MONUC lacked capacity to fully carry through with its strategy combined with a lack of 
wholehearted Congolese government support.  The answers are important because they 
may help future civilian protection missions succeed.  
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The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC)1 was created in 1999 as a traditional peacekeeping operation to 
observe a ceasefire agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Because 
the DRC was devastated by two successive wars in the 1990s, involving a mix of 
regional, national, and local level grievances and actors, MONUC faced a difficult and 
complex environment.  Over time, the mission evolved into a large and expensive multi-
dimensional peacekeeping force, and civilian protection became a core component of its 
mandate.  Civilian protection was not a new concept for the UN; however, it was within 
the first two years of MONUC’s deployment that civilian protection evolved into an 
integral part of UN rhetoric.  The Brahimi Report published in 2000 made it unofficial 
doctrine that peacekeepers should stop violence against civilians, within their means, and 
in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a 
commission created to generate an international agreement, followed with a report titled 
The Responsibility to Protect.2  Since the advent of the R2P mission, the UN has been 
faced with a myriad of issues and challenges relating to civilian protection, both within 
the mandate and in practice.   UN missions are forced to look at underlying issues that 
fuel the conflict in order to determine the best strategies to protect civilians.  MONUC 
was no exception.  MONUC spent the better part of a decade determining how to 
improve civilian protection. 
The complexities of the situation in the DRC during MONUC’s deployment were 
numerous.  Over a decade of conflict in the DRC produced the most civilian deaths since 
World War II, with over 5.4 million conflict-related casualties.  The first civil war in the 
DRC (1996–1997) ousted the predatory President Mobuto Sese Seko.  During his 32-year 
reign, Mobutu plundered state resources to finance his own endeavors and to maintain 
loyal clients, but as the economy eroded in the 1990s, he lost his tight grip on the state, 
                                                 
1 The acronym MONUC comes from the French name, Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies 
en République démocratique du Congo. 
2 Paul D. Williams, Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa 
(Washington D.C.: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 2010), 17.  
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creating a power vacuum that was “filled by predatory neighbors, and armed groups.”3  
To combat cross-border attacks from eastern DRC by former genocidaires, known as the 
Interahamwe, Rwanda formed an anti-Mobutu alliance with Uganda, Angola, Burundi, 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army of southern Sudan, and created the Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire (AFDL) within DRC to remove 
Mobutu from power.4   The AFDL easily marched into Kinshasa and inserted Laurent-
Désiré Kabila into power.   
Kabila’s legitimacy was severely compromised by his Rwandese backing, leading 
him to break with the external anti-Mobutu alliance almost immediately. He then began 
recruiting Interahamwe into his new army, further antagonizing Rwanda while fueling 
decades of local ethnic grievances over land issues, immigration, refugees, and 
citizenship rights in the East.5 New rebel groups, the Rally for Congolese Democracy 
(RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) formed from a mix of 
these local, political, and regional grievances.6  In 1998, another war of local, regional, 
and international grievances and actors began on Congolese soil.  Rwanda, Uganda and 
Burundi backed the rebels but Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia now entered in support of 
the Kabila government, shifting the military balance of power. Rwanda, Burundi and 
Uganda sought to remove Kabila because, like Mobutu, he provided sanctuary for rebels 
fighting each of these governments.  All backed the RCD, while Uganda also backed the 
MLC.  Angola supported Kabila because his government had cooperated more effectively 
in removing Angolan rebels from Congolese territory, and because it feared the chaos and 
economic losses that might ensue if he were overthrown.  Zimbabwe intervened largely 
as an act of political and economic aggrandizement by President Robert Mugabe.  
                                                 
3 George Zachariah, “Regional Framework for State Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo,” Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 1 (2004): 219. 
4 Severine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure to International 
Peacebuilding (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 47–48. 
5 Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a 
Continental Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 177. 
6 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 184. 
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Namibia’s much more limited intervention was to provide a Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) cover to Zimbabwe’s actions.7 
By mid-1999, rebels and government forces were in a stalemate, and participating 
in ceasefire talks brokered by the U.S., EU and UN.  The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 
which called for a national dialogue to establish a peace agreement, the establishment of 
a Joint Military Commission (JMC) to oversee security concerns, and the creation of a 
UN peacekeeping force, was signed by the Kabila government, the RCD and MLC, and 
Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia in July-August 1999.8 However, the ceasefire did 
not stop the fighting, which continued unabated between the armed groups, causing 
further displacement and civilian deaths.9    
In August 1999, MONUC was created to “oversee the withdrawal of foreign 
armies and disarm Congolese and foreign rebels.”10  Despite the fact that the ceasefire 
was not being followed, in November 1999, the first UN military liaison officers, acting 
under UN mandate 1258, arrived in the DRC to monitor the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
and assist with Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Resettlement or 
Repatriation (DDRRR).11  On 24 February 2000, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) authorized expansion to 5,537 military personnel (including 500 military 
observers), to act within their capability to defend themselves and their infrastructure as 
well as “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”12  However, in late 
2000, MONUC still had only 566 people in the DRC, of which 218 were unarmed 
                                                 
7 International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, Africa Report #26 
(International Crisis Group, 20 December 2000), 60. 
8 “Secretary-General Welcomes RCD Signing of Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on Democratic 
Republic of Congo,” United Nations Information Service, September 1, 1999, 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/1999/sg2351.html (accessed 22 June 2011). The RCD was by 
this time fractionalized into RCD-Goma, RCD-National, and RCD-Liberation Movement, largely as a 
result of strained relations between its external backers Rwanda and Uganda.   
9 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 227.  Fighting in the Kivus continued throughout 1999. 
10 Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Figthing 
War,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 216. The acronym MONUC comes from the 
French name, Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo 
11 “First UN Team Arrives in the DR Congo,” BBC News, November 27, 1999, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/. 
12 UN Security Council, Resolution 1291 (2000), UN Doc S/Res/1291 (24 Feb 2000). 
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military observers and only 26 were soldiers, distributed among 7 military observer teams 
located in Kinshasa, Gemena, Isiro, Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani, and Mbandaka.13    
President Laurent Kabila was killed on 16 January 2001, in a failed coup attempt.  
His son Joseph, Chief of Staff of the Army, assumed power, paving the way for new 
peace talks, known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (October 2001-April 2003).14  
Joseph quickly secured international support by agreeing to start the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue.  Without substantial support from his father’s cohorts, Joseph needed to 
balance domestic and international support.15  With international support behind the new 
president, Rwanda and Uganda began to work with Joseph to develop an exit plan under 
tremendous pressure from the international community to withdrawal their forces.16 The 
rebel groups committed themselves to comply with the ceasefire and join the dialogue if a 
power-sharing government was created.17  Rwanda and Uganda signed bilateral 
agreements with the DRC government.  A result of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the 
Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in December 2002 created a plan 
for integrating Kabila’s Army, the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the MLC and RCD 
forces into the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC).18  
The Final Act in Sun City (April 2003) provided for a power sharing government and a 
two-year transition plan for the restoration of peace and sovereignty, ending the Dialogue 
and marking the official end of hostilities.  
From its initial deployment through the end of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, 
MONUC played no real role in civilian protection. MONUC limited its activities to 
                                                 
13 Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War, 249; UN Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary-
General on MONUC, UN Doc S/2000/888 (21 September 2000), 6. 
14 Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Figthing 
War,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 216. 
15 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 258. 
16 International Crisis Group, From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo, Africa 
Report #27 (International Crisis Group, 16 March 2001), 9. 
17 Ibid., iii. 
18 International Crisis Group, “Security Sector Reform in the Congo,” Africa Report #104 (13 
February 2006), 12. 
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monitoring troop withdrawals and DDRRR.19 Despite having a Chapter VII mandate20 
and the advent of R2P, MONUC was mandated only to protect civilians when it had the 
capacity to do so.  This meant MONUC could stop isolated violence but would not get 
between armed groups to protect civilians more systematically.  MONUC expressed 
“grave concern” about the potential for ethnic conflict in Ituri and the Kivus, but it did 
little to preemptively set up protection for the population.21  As the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue drew to an end in 2003, MONUC still had only 4,200 troops and a limited 
mandate.  
In 2003, MONUC’s concerns became a reality as ethnic violence, human rights 
violations, and internal displacement beset the eastern DRC as a result of longstanding 
local issues such as land rights.22 With limited capacity and authority in the east, the 
Congolese government did little to stop it. Large-scale militia violence between ethnic 
Hema and Lendu in Bunia, Ituri in May 2003 was the tipping point for MONUC to adjust 
its mandate, increase its size, and get seriously involved in civilian protection for the first 
time.  MONUC reacted to the events in Bunia and began taking proactive measures to 
preempt ethnic violence in the Kivus.  By 2004, fighting had erupted between the 
FARDC, the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), primarily composed of 
Rwandan Hutu, and the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a rebel 
group created by General Laurent Nkunda to protect the Tutsi population. These rebels, 
and the newly formed FARDC became involved in organized looting, murder, and sexual 
violence against civilians as they fought each other for control of territory.23 In response, 
                                                 
19 “DRC Rebels Reluctant to Pull Back,” BBC News, April 02, 2001, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/. 
20 Chapter VII refers to the chapter in the UN Charter that gives the UN the right to take offensive 
military action to establish and/or restore peace. UN Charter Chapter 7, http://www.un-documents.net/ch-
07.htm (accessed 23 June 2011). 
21 UN Security Council, 12th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, UN Doc S/2002/1180 (18 
October 2002), 5–6; UN Security Council, 12th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, 6. 
22 OCHA DRC Fast Facts, http://ochaonline.un.org/ (accessed 2 Dec 2010). 
23 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, “Kivu’s Intractable Security Conundrum,” African 
Affairs 108, no. 432 (2009): 477. 
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MONUC adopted the full scope of a third generation Peacekeeping Operation (PKO).24  
It began offensive actions and preemptive measures to protect civilians from violence.  
How did MONUC respond to the evolution of the threat to civilians after the 
official end of the war from local ethnic militias, to the FARDC and additional rebel 
groups? What impact did this have on civilian protection and why?  
The adoption of the civilian protection component of UN missions has increased 
demands on the peacekeeping forces, raising questions about the UN’s ability to develop 
comprehensive protection strategies in complex situations.  Since MONUC was 
established in 1999, the Security Council has created 11 new peacekeeping missions, 
eight of which are on the continent of Africa.25  This brings the total number of active 
peacekeeping missions to 15, with 30% of all UN peacekeeping missions now lasting 
more than 10 years and most encompassing a civilian protection clause in their 
mandate.26  In both UN and non-UN mission around the world, civilian protection 
remains integral to mission mandates, and is increasingly linked with security sector 
reform (SSR).  It is important to understand the causes of the UN’s performance in 
reducing violence against civilians, given the emphasis on civilian protection and R2P 
over the last decade and most likely in the future.  There is a consensus in the literature 
that MONUC performed poorly on civilian protection in the DRC, but a debate about 
why the results were such.  One camp suggests that the MONUC failed to develop a 
civilian protection strategy geared toward the true nature of the violence against civilians.  
Autesserre, Wright, and Carayannis argue that the UN focused its effort on national and 
international issues, and thus failed to address the local grievances over land and ethnicity 
                                                 
24 According to Doyle and Sambanis, 1st Generation peacekeeping operations encompassed 
traditional operations between states in which the UN is neutral and merely provides an observation force.  
Second Generation Peacekeeping operations are complex and multidimensional missions that encompass 
policing and military action.  Third generation is also complex multidimensional but includes a 
humanitarian aspect as well as peace enforcement. Michael Doyle and Sambanis Nicholas, Making War 
and Building Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 10–16. 
25 United Nations Peacekeeping List of Operations, 2010, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml (accessed November 6, 2010). 
26 United Nations Peacekeeping List of Operations, 2010, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml (accessed November 6, 2010). 
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that drove violence against civilians.27 Prunier argues that MONUC recognized the 
nature of the threat against civilians, but was too “timid” to make radical changes in its 
strategy to deal with it because of the poor relations with the government of the DRC.28  
Thus, like the others in this camp, he maintains that MONUC did not react to the local 
threats in the east. A second camp argues that MONUC made strides in adapting its 
strategy to protect civilians, but ultimately failed because of structural limitations, such as 
size and strength of its force. 29  This camp suggests that capacity was the primary reason 
for poor civilian protection results. 
This thesis tests these two hypotheses against the available evidence from field 
research.  Hypothesis one is that MONUC failed to protect civilians because its strategy 
was not adapted to the nature of the threat against civilians on the ground.  Hypothesis 
two is that MONUC failed to protect civilians because it lacked the capacity to do so.  
Since these are not necessarily mutually exclusive hypotheses, hypothesis three is that 
both weaknesses in both strategy and capabilities contributed to the failure to protect 
civilians.  This thesis will trace events over time to determine what factors contributed to 
MONUC’s overall effectiveness or lack thereof of civilian protection.     
Chapter II focuses on 2003–2006, when the primary threat against civilians came 
from militia violence.  Chapter III focuses on 2007–2010, when the primary threat 
against civilians came from rebels and the FARDC.  Each chapter looks at whether 
strategy, capability, or both factored into MONUC’s civilian protection results.  Chapter 
IV draws conclusions based on the findings of Chapters II and III, and discusses the 
                                                 
27 Severine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 20;  Alexander Wright, “Ethnic Identity in The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo,” in The State of Africa: Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development, 
eds. Dirk Kotze and Hussein Solomon (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2008), 99;  and Tatiana 
Carayannis, The challenge of building sustainable peace in the DRC (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue, 2009), 14. 
28 Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War, 345. 
29 Jim Terrie, “The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC,” African 
Securities Review 18, no. 1 (2009): 23;  Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?: 
Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: The 
Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 157;  Gustavo De Carvalho, “MONUC and Post-Electoral Challenges in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Conflict Trends, no. 4 (2007): 47; and Denis M. Tull, 
“Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 226. 
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implications of the findings for our understanding of the performance of MONUC and 
civilian protection missions in general, as well as the policy implications of the research. 
 9
II. UN RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS 
(2003–2006) 
Beginning in 2003, MONUC adjusted from a traditional peacekeeping force to a 
robust force with civilian protection as a core component of its mandate.30  With the 
signing of the final peace agreements in 2003, new threats to civilians emerged in the 
East from groups not previously part of the war.  The violence in Bunia, Ituri, in May 
2003 demonstrated the serious threat facing civilians in the post-war period, and became 
a catalyst for MONUC and the UNSC’s change in strategy and mandate. In the short 
term, because MONUC was not structured to deal with this type of violence against 
civilians, the European Union was mandated by the UNSC to deploy its newly created 
rapid reaction force to secure Bunia.  However, by the end of 2003 the UNSC had 
expanded MONUC’s mandate, and MONUC had created a civilian protection strategy 
based on the success of the EU intervention.  This innovative strategy, which centered on 
patrols and protection zones to secure the population against armed militia, improved 
civilian protection. However, the improvements were limited by MONUC’s small—even 
after its troop levels were tripled—size.31  This chapter will examine both MONUC’s 
strategy adjustments as well as changes in its capability from 2003–2006 to determine 
which best explains MONUC’s overall level of civilian protection during this time 
period.  This chapter will argue that MONUC responded aggressively and appropriately 
to changes in the nature and scope of violence directed at civilians, demonstrating a 
significant level of effort to adjust its strategy as well as increase its capability to 
accomplish its mandate of protection within the limits of its resources.    
MONUC’s civilian protection strategy did lead to a significant improvement in 
civilian security between 2003–4 and 2006–7, as civilian deaths from violence in the east 
                                                 
30 UN Security Council, Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, UN Doc S/2001/572 (8 
June 2001), 13. 
31 The troop levels increased from 4,700 in May 2003 to 10,485 in August 2004 to 16,145 in 
September 2005.  UN Security Council, 3rd Special Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, UN Doc 
S/2004/650 (16 August 2004), 38. 
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fell from 14,000 to 5,000. 32 Although the reduction is partly attributable to the fading 
effects of the civil war, International Rescue Committee fieldwork suggests that it was 
also partly a result of “a more robust UN peacekeeping effort by MONUC.”33 The local 
population in Ituri reported in mid-2005 that MONUC’s presence had reduced civilian 
insecurity, despite the resurgence of rebel activity.34 Although the strategy appears to 
have been less effective in the Kivus, especially by 2006–2007, overall civilian deaths 
from violence in the east as a whole nevertheless fell by nearly two-thirds.  The evidence 
will show that both MONUC’s change in strategy as well as its capability led to the 
decline in violent deaths, but it is also MONUC’s capability deficiencies that caused 
MONUC ultimately to fail to eliminate violent deaths further. 
A. STRATEGIC ADAPTATIONS AND CAPACITY BUILDING 
In April 2003, MONUC deployed 700 (of its 3500) peacekeepers to Ituri, near 
Bunia, to monitor the withdrawal of 9,000 Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) 
troops in accordance with the peace agreement.  Its mandate was to assist local 
community leaders with developing a security plan, while protecting only civilians under 
imminent threat.35  Although aware of a high potential for large-scale violence against 
civilians, MONUC did nothing preemptive. Its December 2002 mandate (1445) simply 
authorized the deployment of an unspecified number of troops to the Ituri region if the 
need arose.36  At this time, MONUC and the UNSC were reactive and not committed to 
proactive civilian protection.   Immediately after the 6 May UPDF withdrawal, systematic 
killing and looting by ethnic militias began, as longstanding tensions over land rights 
                                                 
32 Data derived from the International Rescue Committee Survey, Mortality in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. 
33 International Rescue Committee, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing 
Crisis (New York: International Rescue Committee, 2008), 2. 
34 Stephanie Wolters, “Is Ituri on the Road to Stability? An update on the current security situation in 
the district,” Institute for Security Studies: Situation Report, May 12, 2005, 10, 
http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/3663.pdf. 
35 UN Security Council, “Resolution 1468 (2003),” UN Doc S/RES/1468 (2003), 20 March 2003, 3. 
36 UN Security Council, 5653th Meeting, Resolution 1445(2002), UN Doc S/RES/1445 (2002), 4 Dec 
2002, 4. 
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flared in the security vacuum created by the withdrawal.37   MONUC set up roadblocks 
to protect civilians from rampaging militia, but abandoned this effort after its troops were 
overwhelmed.38  Within two weeks, 500 civilians had been killed and 75,000 displaced in 
Bunia in tit for tat attacks by ethnic Hema and Lendu militias.39 Because MONUC lacked 
the capacity to rapidly deploy a force capable of protecting the population from the 
surging violence,40 the UNSG called for deployment of a “well-trained and highly 
equipped multinational force” to provide interim civilian protection.41  The EU, with the 
French as the lead, accepted the challenge to provide a force to secure Bunia while 
MONUC could transition more troops to the area and prepare them for more robust 
action. Its Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) was given a chapter VII 
mandate by the UNSC, including leave to use “all necessary measures to fulfill its 
mandate” of restoring security, protecting the airport, and protecting IDPs and civilians.42  
MONUC troops did participate in the operation, but mainly were limited to providing 
airport security.  Having failed to prepare appropriately, the strong mandate showed the 
UNSC at least willing to innovate to facilitate civilian protection by others.   
IEMF deployed its 1,400 troops in June, declaring Bunia a “weapons invisible” 
zone, meaning that weapons had to be kept at home.  Violations were met with force, 
immediately establishing IEMF credibility. It positioned its troops strategically in conflict 
hot spots to prevent a flare up of violence, patrolled actively by conducting house 
searches, and reduced the flow of arms by monitoring airport traffic.43 Close Air Support 
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(CAS) from its Mirage aircraft operating out of Uganda acted as a force multiplier.  Its 
Special Forces destroyed stockpiles of weapons and disarmed militia.  Order was restored 
within Bunia by July, and the force withdrawn in September.   
From this point on, the UNSC took a more aggressive stance on civilian 
protection.  It increased MONUC’s total troop level from 4,700 in May to 10,415 in 
November 2003,44 and made MONUC a more robust and offensive force, meaning it was 
to take active and aggressive measures to protect the population.  It also had a new 
mandate to stabilize the security situation in Ituri and protect civilians, including but not 
limited to the 500,000 IDPs. In addition, UNSC Resolution 1493 of July 2003, authorized 
MONUC to “use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate in the Ituri district and, as it 
deems within its capabilities, in North and South Kivu.”45  It thus became more 
proactive, although in a tentative way.  MONUC was less tentative.   It radically adjusted 
its forces and its operations, in line with lessons learned from the IEMF, to improve its 
civilian protection capabilities within the limits imposed by the UNSC. With the fresh 
supply of troops, it increased its strength in Ituri from 700 in May to 4,800 in November 
2003, with 2,400 stationed in the town of Bunia alone.46  By the end of 2003, it had 
shifted 80 percent of its force (8,300 troops) to Ituri and the Kivus.47   At the same time, 
it developed an aggressive civilian protection strategy based on the IEMF operation, and 
applied it throughout Ituri Provence.   It announced that, like IEMF, its troops would now 
use force to secure the area and protect civilians.  In addition to strong rhetoric followed 
by forceful implementation, MONUC adopted the IEMF’s offensive operations to find 
and dispel/disarm the militia. It actively patrolled for intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, added 24-hour foot patrols, deployed to seven new locations in Ituri (in 
addition to Bunia), and brought in attack helicopters for CAS.48  Brigadier General Jern 
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Isberg of the Ituri Brigade declared in late 2003: “We are capable of countering any 
attack… We must act according to our new mandate of Chapter Seven immediately and 
without hesitation, to be ready to use force when the situation dictates…”49 Thus, 
MONUC showed substantial willingness to use the resources at its disposal to protect 
civilians from militia violence. Although it did not fully control the entire province 
because MONUC did not have the capacity to position itself in all areas, militia strength 
was reduced in the areas in which it operated.50  Militia violence did not stop, but 
MONUC use strategic adaptation to build upon the initial success in Bunia. 
MONUC took proactive measures to implement its Ituri strategy in the Kivus to 
preempt a similar escalation of ethnic violence there, although limited by the UNSC’s 
instruction to do so within the limits of its existing capabilities.  As in Ituri, ethnic 
conflict in the Kivus continued to simmer after the withdrawal of foreign (in this case 
Rwandan) forces in July 2002.  However, in the Kivus armed non-state actors were rebel 
armies not the youthful militia of Ituri.  The RCD and Mai-Mai vied for control of 
territory despite the peace agreements, and many integrated soldiers continued their 
loyalties to other rebel leaders.51  MONUC had undertaken local conflict resolution 
efforts in the Kivus since September 2003,52 but again as in Ituri, did not engage in active 
civilian protection.  In early 2004, it restructured its force to establish a full brigade 
(roughly 3,000 troops) in North Kivu and a battalion (roughly 1,000 troops) in South 
Kivu, adding an entire brigade worth of troops in the Kivus.53  At the same time, it 
attempted to provide civilian security while quickly disarming RCD and Mai-Mai 
forces.54  In March 2004, in response to increased ethnic tension in Bukavu (South Kivu) 
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and several skirmishes, it increased its troop levels around Bukavu from 450 to 1000 and 
began actively patrolling to search for weapons and reduce militia activity in the town.55  
MONUC’s proactive attempt to implement its Ituri civilian-protection strategy in the 
Kivus, in the absence of the increased capacity the UNSC gave it there, failed to prevent 
a blow up in Bukavu.  In May-June 2004, 4,000 dissident FARDC soldiers, newly 
integrated from the General Laurent Nkunda’s RCD rebel forces, occupied Bukavu, 
killing several hundred civilians.56 Armed non-state actors in the Kivus were larger, more 
organized, and more aggressive than MONUC was capable of handling.  According to 
the ICG, MONUC was not structurally capable with its present capacity at the time to 
deal with the threat in the Kivus.57  The rebel groups like the RCD, the FDLR, and the 
Mai-Mai were too aggressive for MONUC’s 4,000 troops.  MONUC did assist in 
brokering a deal with Nkunda in mid-June 2004 under which he withdrew his troops from 
Bukavu,58 but antagonism between ethnic groups and rebel activity continued throughout 
the Kivus. 
In August 2004, MONUC expanded from one brigade plus a battalion (roughly 
4,000 troops) to two brigades (roughly 6,000 troops) in the Kivus, and requested a 
doubling of its troop level to 20,000 for additional patrols. 59 Additionally, MONUC 
created a civil-military joint mission analysis cell to assess and anticipate ethnic 
conflict.60  This was a forceful step by MONUC, who was using both its civilian as well 
as military contingent, to deal with deep seated local level issues. It used the information 
that it gathered to reinforce its presence in Lubero (North Kivu), where its analysis 
suggested a significant potential for violence against civilians.61    Lastly, It brokered 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 9. 
56 “‘Massive abuses’ in DR Congo,” BBC News,  June 4, 2004, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/. 
57 International Crisis Group, Back to the Brink in the Congo (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 24 
January 2003), 2. 
58 “South Kivu: June 2004: Situation report and recommendations for engagement,” Africa Initiative 
Programme, June 2004, http://www.fewer-international.org/images/lib/(accessed 10 June 2011). 
59 UN Security Council, 3rd Special Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, 25. 
60 Ibid., 25. 
61 The size of the reinforcements was not reported.  UN Security Council, 16th Report of the 
Secretary-General on MONUC, UN Doc S/2004/1034, 31 December 2004, 5. 
 15
ceasefires between dissident ex-RCD-Goma and the FARDC in an attempt to dissuade 
additional violence. These quick and aggressive actions coupled with the significant 
measures taken by MONUC to address local level issues show that MONUC was 
engaged in local conflict drivers. In October the UNSC added 5,900 troops, roughly half 
the number requested by MONUC, again increasing emphasis on civilian protection.62  
By expanding the mandate while refusing to provide sufficient resource to accomplish it, 
the UNSC was setting MONUC up to fail. 
Despite MONUC’s intentions and measures, violence against civilians continued.  
In December 2004, clashes between integrated ex-RCD units and other FARDC units 
caused displacement and looting in Kanyabayonga (North Kivu).63 In May 2005, the 
village of Ihembe (South Kivu) and areas within the Walunga territory (South Kivu) were 
attacked by FDLR elements.64 In August, ethnic clashes broke out in Rutshuru (North 
Kivu) between ex-RCD-G troops waiting to go through the brassage process and Mai-
Mai militia, again threatening civilians and leading to more displacement.65 From 
September through December 2005, there were reprisal attacks in South Kivu by FDLR 
forces and generalized insecurity among civilians caused by rogue FARDC elements.  
Military operations by militia groups were also increasing again in 2005, as groups 
fought over access to illegal business at the Ugandan border.66 
MONUC attempted to combat the increasingly aggressive threat to civilians in the 
east by making its own strategy more forceful. It increased patrols, created security zones 
and village vigilance committees to protect civilians throughout the Kivus, and threatened 
offensive action against any armed group that threatened civilians.67   Desperately short 
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of troops as a result of the UNSC’s decision, MONUC took the radical step of including 
the FARDC in its civilian protection efforts. In Ituri, it coordinated with the FARDC to 
increase disarmament, destroy militia camps, and reinforce IDP camp security in the 
interests of civilian protection.68  MONUC and FARDC patrols severely weakened 
rebels.69  Similarly, in the Kivus MONUC worked with the FARDC to decrease rebel 
activity and forcefully disarm them,70 increasing “area domination and cordon-and-
search operations” as well as day and night patrols.71 Using the FARDC as a force 
multiplier in civilian protection demonstrates MONUC’s commitment to accomplishing 
its task of civilian protection, even without adequate UNSC support.  
However, the strategy proved to too radical. In 2006, additional FARDC 
integrated brigades were sent to the Kivus to reduce rebel activity.  In January, it engaged 
in heavy fighting in North Kivu against Laurent Nkunda’s newly formed National 
Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), causing over 40 civilian casualties and 
the displacement of 200,000.72 MONUC reported attacks by the FARDC 5th integrated 
brigade on civilians in the CNDP area of operation led the CNDP and the FARDC 83rd 
integrated brigade, which included former troops of Nkunda, to attack the 5th brigade.73 
Similar intra-FARDC clashes and attacks on civilians occurred near Goma (North Kivu) 
in August.74  Because the FARDC lacked the professionalism and neutrality of UN 
forces, it quickly became the single largest threat to civilians, rather than an extension of 
MONUC civilian protection capacity.  By mid-2006, 40% of all human rights violations 
in the Kivus, including killings, beatings, illegal arrests, and rapes, were committed by 
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the FARDC.75  With the nature of the threat to civilians now fundamentally changed 
from what it was in Ituri in 2003, the time had come for another fundamental shift in 
MONUC’s civilian protection strategy.  
B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF IMPROVED CIVILIAN PROTECTION: 
BOTH STRATEGY AND CAPABILITY 
MONUC’s civilian protection strategy was aggressive, innovative, and most 
importantly designed to counter the local sources of violence against civilians.  The steps 
it took to adjust the strategy, in light of the evolution of that threat to civilians, especially 
in the Kivus, against demonstrates its close engagement with the drivers of local conflicts 
that ultimately produced civilians causalities.   Active patrolling to locate militia and keep 
them away from civilians, airport surveillance and cordon and search operations to limit 
availability of weapons to those who might join the militias reduced attacks on civilians.  
The aggressiveness with which the strategy was implemented was key to its relative 
success, in that it created a deterrent, at least in Ituri, without which its force size might 
have further limited its effectiveness.  For instance, it responded to a deadly militia 
ambush of one of its patrols in February 2005 by arresting several hundred militia 
fighters and confiscating of several hundred weapons that same month.76 MONUC’s 
increased cordon and search operations after a surge in militia activity in 2005 led to the 
disarmament of over 10,000 of the estimated 15,000 militia combatants that year.77 
Aggressive DDRRR isolated troops and increased the number of those willing to give up 
arms.78  
Additionally, MONUC’s capacity served both to enhance as well as limit its 
effectiveness.  MONUC’s increase in troops and equipment enhanced MONUC’s ability 
to accomplish the mission, but it did not have the capacity to completely eliminate the 
threat of violence.  Civilian deaths from violence remained over 5,000 in 2006-7 because 
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MONUC’s effectiveness was limited by several factors, mostly notably its inadequate 
size. Although MONUC increased from 4,000 to over 16,000 troops between 2003 and 
2005, this was still not nearly enough for its civilian protection mandate, and therefore, 
MONUC lacked sufficient capacity to fully protect the population.  UN forces in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone had roughly the same number of troops at their peak (15,000 and 
17,000, respectively), in countries that that are 1/20 and 1/30 the size of DRC, 
respectively.79  With such a large and difficult area to cover, MONUC’s 6,000 troops in 
the Kivus were no match for over 24,000 experienced combatants.80  Although 
MONUC’s actions did prove to increase civilian protection from 2003-2006, the armed 
groups did not perceive MONUC as a deterrent.81   This would be a precursor for follow-
on violence against civilians. 
To summarize, in the years 2003–2006, MONUC aggressively designed and 
adjusted its civilian protection strategy in response to the evolving nature of violent 
threats against civilians.  Adopting civilian protection as a core component of its mission 
after the Bunia Massacre in 2003, it developed a strategy in line with what worked for the 
EU there.  It shifted its forces to the East and devoted them to civilian protection, 
showing a high level of will and effort.  The UNSC, on the other hand, consistently 
increased MONUC’s civilian protection mandate, while denying it the resources it 
requested to carry out the mission.  It increased MONUC’s mandated size, but not by 
enough to fully complete its mandated task of civilian protection.  Ultimately, the 
evidence suggests that both the strategy as well as the capability of MONUC contributed 
to the improved but not perfect civilian protection.  From 2003–2006, many changes 
were made to MONUC’s mandate, size, structure, and strategy, and each contributed to 
the resultant improvement in civilian protection in the East.  The area was not without its 
share of violence, and MONUC would need to make further adjustments to deal with the 
shifting threat to civilians in an attempt to improve protection. 
                                                 
79 UN Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ (accessed 25 July 2011). 
80 International Crisis Group The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, Africa Report #91 
(International Crisis Group, 30 March 2005), 1. 
81 Ibid., 24. 
 19
III. UN RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS 
(2007–2010) 
With the primary threat to civilians coming from organized and well-equipped 
rebels and the FARDC by mid-2006, MONUC continued extensive joint operations with 
the FARDC against the CNDP and the FDLR, but added a focus on professionalizing the 
FARDC.  With the UNSC unwilling to provide the necessary troops, MONUC saw no 
alternative to working with and through the FARDC to accomplish its civilian protection 
mission.  The dual aim of this new civilian protection strategy was to contain FARDC 
abuses while defeating rebel forces, a radical approach to its civilian protection strategy.  
This chapter will show that, in 2007, MONUC made another innovative and extensive 
strategy change in response to the shifting nature of violence against civilians, again 
demonstrating its significant willingness to protect the population by dealing with 
underlying local level issues.  However, it all shows that this strategy was far less 
effective than the previous one had been, largely as a result of failure to implement fully 
due to constraints imposed by the UNSC and the Congolese government.  Thus, 
ultimately, this period will show that MONUC failed to provide adequate civilian 
protection because it lacked the capacity to do so not because it did not properly adapt to 
the nature of the threat against civilians. 
Unfortunately, the considerable adjustments made to protect the population that 
MONUC demonstrated through its innovative strategizing in 2007-2010 did not produce 
even the reasonable results of the 2003–2006 period.  The FARDC and rebel groups 
continued to be the primary perpetrators of violence against civilians,82 and the level of 
such violence increased during the time period. For this period rape statistics are more 
reliable than death statistics (Figure 1).  Although this data is still somewhat unreliable, it 
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is sufficient to conclude that MONUC’s new strategy was ineffective.83  Consistent 
reporting of FARDC atrocities throughout the period also supports this conclusion. What 
explains this ineffectiveness?  
 
 
Figure 1.   Sexual Violence in the Kivus (2007–2010)84 
A. STRATEGY ADJUSTMENT  
In 2007, there was a surge in violence against civilians in the Kivus as a result of 
fighting between/amongst the FARDC and CNDP and FDLR, respectively, as well as 
between the CNDP and FDLR.85  In January, post-election violence in South Kivu 
between the FARDC and dissident Banyamulenge soldiers killed 200 civilians and 
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displaced thousands.86 In February, over 90 civilians were killed in Bas Congo when 
fighting broke out between the Bunda dia Kongo sect, protesting election rigging, and the 
FARDC.87 In March, clashes between guards of defeated presidential candidate Jean-
Pierra Bemba and the FARDC killed 600 civilians in Kinshasa.88 MONUC accused the 
FARDC of “indiscriminate and disproportionate” use of force in each case, and called 
upon the newly elected government of Joseph Kabila to prioritize DSR.89  It continued its 
own patrols and protection centers in the east as well as its efforts with the FARDC, but 
recognized that these measures were not sufficient to protect the civilian population from 
the FARDC.   
In May 2007, MONUC shifted from joint patrols with the FARDC to protect 
civilians to direct efforts to eliminate the rebel groups and reform the FARDC in response 
to the changed nature of the threat to civilians.  UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-
Moon urged “the Government of the DRC and the international community to work 
together in creating professional security forces capable of defending the security and 
human rights of the people of the DRC.”90 The UNSC passed Resolution 1756 (May 
2007) authorizing MONUC to work with the FARDC (which it had already been doing) 
to neutralize rebel groups (including the FDLR and CNDP), and:  
Provide in the short term basic training, including in the area of human 
rights, international humanitarian law, child protection and the prevention 
of gender-based violence, to various members and units of the FARDC 
integrated brigades; develop the capacities of the Congolese national 
police and related law enforcement agencies…by providing technical 
assistance, training, and mentoring support; advise the government in 
strengthening the capacity of the judicial and correctional system; and 
assist in the planning process.91 
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In July, MONUC began 3-month training programs for 11 FARDC brigades in 
the east, focusing on discipline, prevention of human rights violations and sexual 
misconduct, operational capacity, and unit cohesion.92 This set the stage for large-scale 
joint operations against the remaining rebel groups, in which MONUC and the FARDC 
would for the first time conduct full scale operational planning.  As shown in Chapter II, 
MONUC had assisted FARDC operations against the CNDP intermittently since 2005, 
but their operations together were not jointly planned.  Previously, MONUC would assist 
the FARDC in order to provide civilian protection while the FARDC made efforts to 
eliminate the threat. The joint operations in 2008-2010 were an intensification of the 
missions because MONUC was no longer just trying to disarm rebel groups through 
coercion; they were fighting rebel groups in combat alongside the FARDC.   As in 2003, 
MONUC responded in a timely and aggressive manner to the shifting nature of threats 
against civilians, and continued to revise its strategy in response to immediate lessons 
learned.   
Beginning in mid-2007, MONUC worked to implement its new strategy to 
reform/train the FARDC while beefing up the use of force against rebels. By August 
2008, MONUC had provided ethics, human rights, tactics, and weapons training for 12 of 
the 33 FARDC battalions (about 12,000 total troops trained) located in North and South 
Kivu.93  Recognizing that this strategy was long shot, it redeployed two battalions of its 
own troops to the east, increasing the total from 15 of 17 battalions, by the end of 2008, 
and set up additional mobile operating bases to extend its patrols throughout the region.94  
The number of mobile operation bases in the Kivus grew from 18 in January 2008 to 48 
in July 2008.95  In so spreading out its own forces, it was stretching itself much thinner in 
a desperate effort to protect civilians with an inadequately sized force, while hoping that 
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its efforts with the FARDC would reduce the threat to them.  The new strategy thus 
sought to increase the supply and reduce the demand for civilian protection.       
The first large-scale joint FARDC/MONUC operation, in August-January 2008, 
sought to keep the CNDP out of population centers.96 MONUC helped the FARDC push 
back the CNDP when it threatened to take over Sake (North Kivu) in September.97  In 
October 2008, MONUC provided attack helicopters for CAS and armored units to the 
FARDC to prevent the CNDP from entering highly populated areas around Goma.98  The 
FARDC nevertheless dispersed, wreaking havoc on the civilian population as it retreated, 
leaving MONUC to defend Goma.  Throughout this operation, MONUC assisted the 
FARDC with keeping the CNDP at bay, but despite this, without a consistent chain of 
command and professionalized soldiers, the FARDC continued its own abuses on the 
population.  
MONUC saw this as largely a failure of leadership, and thus intensified its 
professionalization efforts with a new focus on leadership.  It requested an additional 200 
trainers/advisors for the FARDC in November 2008, and conducted officer training for 
70 officers as well as train-the-trainer courses in December 2008.  It was unable to train 
more battalion-sized units because the FARDC refused to cooperate.99  Consistently, the 
FARDC reported that it was unable to send more battalions for training because they 
were wrapped up in their missions against the CNDP.  This caused MONUC to tweak its 
DSR strategy further.   
The joint operation ended in January 2009 when Rwanda arrested CNDP leader 
Laurent Nkunda and political talks began, leading to the integration of the CNDP into the 
FARDC immediately.  Ultimately, the collapse of the CNDP was a giant step forward 
toward eliminating threats in the East, and it allowed the FARDC to continue its fight 
against other rebel groups.  MONUC’s strategy adjustment did succeed in accomplishing 
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one goal of its new strategy, neutralization of a rebel group, but ultimately was 
insufficient to reduce violence against civilians.  
The FARDC then turned its attention to the FDLR, with MONUC assistance.100  
The joint FARDC-MONUC campaign, known as Kimia II (Quiet in Swahili), ran from 
March to December 2009. MONUC’s goal for the operation was to “to ensure that all 
FARDC units involved in those operations abide by international humanitarian law and 
prioritize the protection of civilians.”101 As a result of the joint operation, the FARDC 
gained control of all major population centers as well as territorial capitals in North and 
South Kivu, pushing the FDLR into sparsely populated areas away from illegal mining 
and trading centers, and reduced the strength of the FDLR from 6,000 to 3,000, through 
desertion, economic deprivation, and rebels turning in their weapons to participate in 
DDRRR.102 Although the mission did have some limited success at reducing the size of 
the FDLR, ultimately, it did not accomplish the goals of MONUC.  It neither decreased 
the violence against civilians nor did it eliminate the threat from the rebel group. 
During Kimia II, MONUC further enhanced the DSR component of its civilian 
protection strategy in response to the poor performance of the FARDC during the 
previous operation.  Having seen that existing human rights training was insufficient, 
MONUC commander General Babacar Gaye concluded that civilian protection under 
conditions prevailing in the region required MONUC to work alongside FARDC to 
reinforce human rights measures.103  Under this “mentorship” strategy, MONUC units 
were embedded within FARDC battalions for the first time.  During Kimia II, MONUC 
agreed to support and mentor 16,000 out of 60,000 FARDC troops.  Given that MONUC 
had roughly 15,000 troops assigned in the Kivus, MONUC had nearly a 1:1 ratio devoted 
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to mentoring.104  Although, MONUC was only mentoring one-quarter of FARDC troops 
in the East, there were a significant number of MONUC troops assigned to mentoring 
FARDC troops.      
In response to civilian protection failures caused by strictly military action in the 
previous operation, MONUC also created Joint Protection Teams (JTPs), comprised of 
both civilian and military staff, to coordinate with local communities to determine their 
security needs at the local level.  In 2009, 25 JPTs were started in 12 different locations 
throughout North Kivu, each comprised a small contingent of military and civilian 
personnel proficient in political and civilian affairs, DDRRR, and human rights.105  These 
units were tasked with identifying local level issues and determining the best method of 
resolution. Quick reaction units were also deployed to areas deemed high risk for 
civilians.106  These MONUC units were created within the mobile operating bases to 
provide rapid protection against potential FDLR movements into populated areas without 
a standing protection force.  MONUC was adjusting to the lesson learned that they could 
militarily clear an area, but they needed to provide consistent forces to hold the area.  
Since they were limited in troops size, the quick reaction units were used to expand the 
operating area.   
Because continued civilian attacks by the FARDC continued despite mentorship, 
in June 2009, MONUC placed conditionalities on continued operational and logistical 
support to the FARDC to dissuade abuses against civilians.  
The policy specified that MONUC would not participate in or support 
operations with FARDC units if there are substantial grounds for  
believing that there is a real risk that such units will violate international 
humanitarian, human rights or refugee law in the course of the 
operation.107  
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It would also terminate support to any unit that allowed abuses or did not punish troops 
that committed violations.  These refinements of MONUC’s civilian protection strategy 
in response to immediate lessons learned again demonstrates its considerable effort to 
deal with local level issues to protect civilians, within the constraints imposed upon it by 
the UNSC.   
Kimia II ended in December 2009, without the elimination of the FDLR or the 
reduction in violence against civilians.  Therefore, in January 2010, MONUC and the 
FARDC rolled right into Operation Amani Leo (Peace Now in Swahili) with the mission 
to “protect the civilian populations, clear strategic areas of negative forces, hold territory 
liberated from FDLR control, and assist in restoring State authority in these zones.”108  
MONUC again added new measures to reinforce its DSR/civilian protection objectives.  
At the outset of the operation, it vetted unit commanders with the FARDC approval that 
were to receive support.  It screened and cleared the commanders of 18 battalions that 
were to receive logistical support; commanders that MONUC had confidence in and had 
previous records indicating that they would enforce human rights policies.109  This was 
designed to improve FARDC compliance with the conditionalities adopted in June 2009, 
because units would only receive support if their commanders had records of upholding 
and respecting human rights in the past.  
Thus, throughout this time period, MONUC continually reinforced its 
DRS/civilian protection strategy in response to lessons emerging on the ground.  It tried a 
number of different strategies to contain FARDC abuses of civilians and adjusted its own 
mechanisms of protection spreading itself thin to establish a broader (if smaller) 
presence.  It added joint protection teams and additional mobile operating bases with the 
hopes of better identifying local level issues.  These measures clearly indicate effort to 
protect civilians by doing as much as it possible could with the resources available to it.  
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UNSC provided resources were too few, and FARDC resources extremely problematic.  
But these were what it had to work with.   
B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF FAILED CIVILIAN PROTECTION: 
LACK OF CAPABILITY 
MONUC successfully adjusted its strategy to mach the threat to civilians in the 
East; however, it did not have the capability to fully realize its goals within its strategy.  
Implementation failures due to lack of capability are the primary explanation for the 
failure of MONUC’s innovative civilian protection strategy in these years.  These failures 
came from two sources in this period, the UNSC and the government of DRC.  First, the 
UNSC did not provide MONUC the assets, money, or personnel needed to implement its 
DSR/civilian protection strategy.  In October 2008, the UNSG informed the Security 
Council that MONUC was overstretched and outlining its force, structure, and equipment 
needs to protect civilians.  In October 2008, MONUC requested an additional 2,785 
troops, and an increase in logistics and airlift capability noting that “the resources 
available to the Mission are not commensurate with the security challenges on the 
ground, thereby putting in question the credibility of the United Nations and the 
international community…”110 The UNSC approved the additional troops, did not prevail 
upon member states to provide them.  For the next two years, MONUC made continual 
requests to the UNSC to come up with the approved troops, with no success.  MONUC 
also never received the 16 helicopters it requested as vital in 2008.111  As noted in 
Chapter II, MONUC was simply far too small for its mission.  Its 2008 budget was 
roughly $1 billion, compared to the UN mission in Liberia’s budget of roughly $700 
million, to cover a small territory with no active militia or rebel activity.112  The U.S., 
which assumed responsibility for DSR in Liberia, had a DSR budget of $200 million for a 
force number 1/30th that of FARDC troops in eastern Congo alone.   
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This was exacerbated by the lack of cooperation from the Congolese government.  
Army reform needs such as pay, living conditions, and family support were not 
addressed, and soldiers used their extreme poverty and frustration to rationalize sexual 
violence against women.113  When MONUC reported in 2008 that “arbitrary execution, 
rape, torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment by FARDC and the Congolese 
National Police” were a matter of “grave concern,”114 the Congolese government took 
steps to eliminate MONUC from its operations rather than addressing its concerns—or 
even defending itself against them.  It made a deal with the government of Rwanda, with 
whom its relations had long been strained, to undertake alternate joint operations against 
the CNDP and FDLR, beyond the watchful eye, and conditionalities, of MONUC.115  
Such evasion by the Congolese government undermined MONUC’s DSR efforts, and 
thus its civilian protection strategy.    In 2009, MONUC had the capacity to mentor and 
support only 16,000 of the 60,000 FARDC troops in the Kivus because it had inadequate 
support from the UNSC.116  But the government refused to cooperate with even this 
limited training plan, refusing to send units for training on the grounds that forces could 
not be spared in the field.  As a result the DSR process stalled entirely.117  
If strongly implemented, the conditionality policy, which required few resources 
and little government cooperation, might have filled the gap.  However, the conditionality 
policy did not act as a deterrent to violence against civilians because it remained largely 
unimplemented. Despite widespread, well-documented violations by FARDC, only one 
unit was suspended from logistical support for gross human rights violations, and then 
only in November as the operation was drawing to a close.118 MONUC turned a blind 
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eye to avoid complete mission termination because it lacked the capacity to deal with the 
threat from both the FARDC and the rebels alone. Additionally, MONUC was faced with 
the reality that the FARDC was committed to the operation against the FDLR and 
therefore, terminating support completely would result in further rebel attacks on 
civilians.  On the other hand, without support and mentorship, the FARDC simply 
displaced rebel attacks on civilians with attacks of its own.  The government also 
exacerbated the situation by putting newly integrated leaders of the CNDP accused of 
gross human rights violations in charge of key elements in Kimia II.119  If MONUC had 
stopped support to all of the units committing human rights violations, the joint 
operations would have ground to a halt, indicating that MONUC was completely 
incapable of executing its mission.   
MONUC’s vetting strategy suffered from the same general problems that 
MONUC witnessed with training and conditionality. It did not cause FARDC units to 
decrease their attacks on civilians, and although MONUC vetted the commanders, the 
units were not persuaded to respect human rights of the population. Despite vetting the 
commander, in June 2010, MONUSCO suspended support to the FARDC 911th battalion 
for failing to comply with the conditionality policy due to continued gross human rights 
violations.120 MONUC/MONUSCO’s incentive based policy did not work because the 
incentives were not strong enough given MONUC’s lack of resources, and the Congolese 
government did not put enough pressure on the FARDC to uphold the standards.   Since 
the vetting of commanders reduced the number of FARDC soldiers receiving support 
from 16,000 to 1,600,121 it caused the FARDC to stop including MONUC on its mission 
planning. For instance, in South Kivu, the FARDC planned and conducted 74 missions 
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without the knowledge of MONUC,122 violating an agreement of the joint operation.  
Thus, the Congolese government put a higher priority on eradicating the FDLR than 
reform for the FARDC.  Also, MONUC lacked the capacity to continue its support for 
16,000 troops because it received inadequate assistance from the UNSC.  As of March 
2010, MONUC had unpaid outstanding contributions amounting to $663.4 million, 
indicating UNSC commitment in 2010 was extremely low.123   
In summary, the evidence suggests that MONUC correctly adapted to the nature 
of the threat to civilians, but it lacked the capacity to fully realize its goals.  Its reform 
strategy was in line with the primary threat facing civilians, the FARDC.  The expanded 
joint missions were also in line with the rebel threat.  Neither was successful in reducing 
violence because MONUC did not get the support that it needed.    
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IV.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The evidence presented in this thesis clearly shows that MONUC made a 
concentrated effort to protect civilians in DRC, demonstrating that despite the civilian 
protection results, MONUC understood and reacted accordingly to the realities on the 
ground.  It recognized the changing nature of threats to civilians and reacted by adjusting 
its strategic level operations.  In response to the flaring of militia attacks on civilians in 
the east, it expanded in size and mandate and created a robust patrol strategy using the 
lessons learned from the EU in Ituri.  With intensified operations in the Kivus, the largest 
threat to civilians became the FARDC and rebel groups, and MONUC again responded 
by shifting its civilian protection strategy in aggressive and innovative ways, conducting 
joint missions and DSR in an effort to improve civilian protection.   The evidence 
suggests, contrary to the consensus in the literature, that MONUC had a degree of success 
in 2003–2006, reducing militia violence against civilians.  However, the evidence 
supports the consensus for the period after 2006, indicating a complete failure on the part 
of MONUC to protect civilians from rebel activity and FARDC atrocities.  MONUC had 
the resolve to make continual adjustments to achieve its overall objective of better 
civilian protection, but lacked the capacity and government cooperation to carry through.  
Ultimately, the problem was not the failure to understand or respond to the local nature of 
the threat at the strategic level as some literature suggests, but rather, insufficient capacity 
to carry through fully on the promised strategy adopted.  This thesis tested three 
hypotheses and found that MONUC failed to protect the population because it lacked 
sufficient capacity to do so. 
It is important to understand which hypothesis accurately portrays the causes of 
MONUC’s poor civilian protection results overall because it helps give insight into the 
performance of MONUC.  The evidence did not support the hypothesis that MONUC 
failed to protect civilians because it failed to adequately and appropriately respond to 
local level violence.  On the contrary, MONUC made adjustments that were in line with 
the highest threat to civilians at the local level, but it lacked the capacity to follow 
through fully at the strategic level.  Ultimately, it was unable to adequately apply its 
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strategy across the board, as was seen with both DSR and the joint missions.  Why?  The 
decline in effectiveness between the two periods of study suggests that missions that have 
limited capacity and limited cooperation from the host government can be effective up to 
a point, but not fully successful.  Armed youth militias were affected by MONUC patrols 
and its more aggressive posture.  Rebel groups and FARDC were not.  MONUC was able 
to fill a security vacuum when correctly sized, mandated, and equipped, as seen in its 
limited success with the Ituri militia after the Bunia massacre; however, it was unable to 
stop attacks by rebels and army soldiers on civilians in the Kivus.   MONUC was able to 
contain attacks on civilians by militia because it appropriately dealt with local issues on 
the ground without substantial host nation involvement; however, it only was able to 
accomplish this with support from the UNSC and contributing countries.  Without 
sufficient host nation and UNSC support, MONUC was unable to fully realize its civilian 
protection goals in the east.  The importance of adequate capacity is self-evident, but this 
thesis provides evidence to support that this was the sole reason for MONUC’s failure to 
realize better civilian protection results. 
Recognizing that MONUC made appropriate adjustments to its strategy in line 
with the realities on the ground is important because it suggests that the UN needs to 
figure out how to adequately support missions not redesign how missions carry out its 
civilian protection strategies.  This thesis has shown that UN missions need solid and 
long-term political and financial backing from the UNSC and its contributing members.  
MONUC did not have this.  With adequate support, civilian protection depends upon 
recognizing the nature of threats and creating strategies that match the nature of it, which 
the evidence shows that MONUC did.  To do this, it is necessary to understand the root 
causes of the conflict, to include both local level issues as well as national and regional 
interests.  It was clear in the case of the DRC that all of these factors played into the 
violence.  In addition to local and national drivers, regional support from various 
countries allowed rebel groups to get resupplied and resourced.  This compounded the 
local issues facing the East.      
Additionally, it is important to understand causal factors on civilian protection 
effectiveness because civilian protection missions by the UN are not going away. If 
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anything, they might increase, and as was the case in the DRC, there are a myriad of 
factors that must be addressed in order to achieve sufficient civilian protection.  The UN 
cannot blindly adopt a civilian protection mission without adequate knowledge of who is 
being protected, why, and from whom.  MONUC’s case shows that the UNSC needs to 
focus its efforts on giving missions the capacity to carry out the correctly chosen strategy 
for the situation, and the mission needs to make correct decisions on how develop its 
strategy based on the highest threat. 
Lastly, it is important to understand that MONUC’s poor civilian protection 
results from 2007–2010 prove that host nation support in addition to capacity is vital to 
mission success. For instance, the international community needs host nation support in 
order conduct successful DSR.  As MONUC witnessed, host nation support is vital 
because the government must also possess the resolve to achieve effective results in DSR.  
Although there will be outside donors from various countries and organizations, 
ultimately, the host nation must make a commitment toward reform.  In the DRC, the 
government was willing to agree to the various measures toward reform, but it showed 
little interest in making true reform.  Given the history of predatory leadership in the 
DRC, the military has always been seen as an enemy to the people.  There are 
longstanding issues that need to be addressed by the Congolese government about the 
military.   MONUC’s case provides evidence for other missions that may be in a similar 
defense reform environment.      
The thesis attempted to clarify a debate in the literature on why MONUC 
performed so poorly at providing civilian protection after a period of success. The 
evidence shown in this thesis provide a solid explanation as to how it was possible for 
MONUC to correctly respond to the situation on the ground but still fail at civilian 
protection in the end.  This thesis supports the literature that suggests MONUC was not 
adequately structured, sized, or supported by the UNSC. It showed the causal pathways 
of why the mission failed to adequately protect civilians.  It added to the existing body of 
literature by providing evidence of some improved civilian protection during the 2003-
2006 timeframe, which proved that MONUC could have a degree of success when 
correctly matched against the threat.  Because the UNSC had a strong interest in 
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providing the necessary support immediately following the Bunia massacre, it gave 
MONUC the tools that it needed to succeed.  This support waned when the threat from 
rebels and the FARDC increased.  There were consistent increases in the size of 
MONUC, but these were insignificant compared with the threat. 
These findings are noteworthy to the UN because they provide evidence to 
support what is required when undertaking a large and complex civilian protection 
mission, like the one in the DRC.  Without substantial support from the UNSC and 
contributing countries as well as host nation backing of the mission, there is little chance 
of success.  Presumably, the UN should not undertake these types of missions unless they 
are fully prepared to stay committed and have trusted support from the host nation.  
Additionally, these findings suggest that joint operations may be required to eradicate the 
primary threat to civilians; however, the mission needs sufficient capacity to undertake 
these endeavors.  MONUC was forced to acquiesce to the FARDC because it did not 
have the capability to do more.  Using MONUC as a test case, the focus of effort for 
reform should be on contributing countries and host nations, not necessarily the mission 
itself.  Given the evidence presented in this thesis, organizations like Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) and the ICG should focus their fact-finding efforts on contributing nations 
support, not just critiquing the mission itself. 
This thesis has shown the importance of understanding the nature of the threat, 
and there can be future research done both in the DRC and elsewhere to determine 
whether the UN has accurately observed and reacted to the correct threat.  Although it is 
not exclusively related to civilian protection results, when combined with adequate 
capacity, it does factor in on mission success.   
Although there is a dearth of literature on DSR and SSR in conflict, this thesis 
provides a basis for further research on comparison of DSR throughout post-conflict 
countries.  In light of the failures with the conditionality policies and the realities on the 
ground, there was no commitment to uphold the standards within MONUC’s policies or 
get commitment from the host nation to follow them. Second, the UN needs to set 
policies for DSR that incorporates the host nation, the UN, and donor nations. 
Coordination with donors, the UN, and the host nation should not be an afterthought.  
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Additionally, the UN should address policies that stipulate adequate troop levels given 
the size of the area, the threat, and the size of the population it is intending to protect.  
Civilian protection is a cornerstone of recent peacekeeping missions, and the UN needs 
policies and procedures in place to effectively conduct this mission.  It is unrealistic to 
expect militaries to be able to fight enemies while protecting civilians from harm without 
proper training and tactics.  MONUC proved this.  Peacekeepers need enhanced training, 
tactics, and procedures to conduct this mission. Lastly, the UN should have 
procedures/policies in place to deal with a lack of host nation support.  
What lessons does this experience offer to future peacekeeping endeavors?  
Without substantial support from both the international community as well as the host 
nation government, the mission has little chance of prolonged success at civilian 
protection.  MONUC did not have support from the government, who viewed MONUC 
as an occupying force, and they failed to get the support that they needed from the 
international community.  Next, peacekeeping missions require flexibility and must be 
willing to adapt when an initiative is not working.  MONUC remained committed to its 
goal of civilian protection and despite failures it was willing to make changes to realize 
its goals.  Third, peacekeeping forces must understand the local context of the situation.  
MONUC had to deal with a vast array of local grievances and longstanding ethnic 
agendas.  This led to MONUC’s inability to fully implement change within the ranks of 
the highly divisive FARDC.  Lastly, as the second highly complex and controversial UN 
peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONUC’s mission provides a lesson for future 
peacekeeping endeavors that the a peacekeeping force alone cannot solve the problems.  
MONUC’s initial reaction to the violence was to increase in size, but it quickly realized 
that although expansion might be required, it alone wouldn’t solve the problems.  Despite 
MONUC’s inability to fully implement reform, it stands as a lesson that DSR is required 
for stability.   
This thesis attempted to understand how MONUC responded to the situation it 
faced, and why it had some initial success but ultimately failed to realize its goal of 
civilian protection.  This study is important for future peacekeeping operations because it 
sheds the light on some issues that transcend the boundaries of all operations.  MONUC 
 36
expanded in size and strengthened its mandate, which did reduce attacks on civilians.  
This evidence shows that peacekeeping missions need proper strategies as well as 
capacity. Civilians continue to suffer in the East because DSR has not been realized 
because MONUC’s strategy, good in design, was not fully realized.  MONUC’s 
experience shows that a coordinated and both bottom-up and top-down approach is 
needed.  MONUC needed to understand local concerns, but it also needed cooperation 
from the Congolese government.  Without these, MONUC could not achieve the success 
that it desired.  Ultimately, MONUC will serve as a future example both good and bad for 
all multidimensional peacekeeping missions.   
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